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ARTICLE

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AND THE
CONTOURS OF PRUDENCE

ROBERT

I.

K.

VISCHER*

INTRODUCTION

Academics tend to traffic in big-picture theories. We like to construct
abstract answers to abstract questions, and when we do decide to talk in
terms that might be useful to folks in their everyday lives, the terms flow
from theory. No wonder that relatively little attention has been paid to prudence, which Augustine defined as "love choosing wisely between things
that help and those that hinder."l Prudence does not lend itself to academic
commentary; it is a sort of anti-theory, grounded in right thinking, not big
answers.2
Our disregard of prudence is a shame because prudence connects the
general (i.e., an authentic understanding of the human person and its relationship to creation) with the particular (i.e., how one should live in light of
that understanding). By focusing on the actor's exercise of sound judgment,
prudence is not unprincipled, but it is not defined solely in reference to
fixed principles either. This distinguishes it from the dominant mindset of
many of our current culture-war battles, in which principles are deployed in
absolute terms with little regard for context.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis,
Minn. This article was presented at the Terrence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law
and Public Policy's 2006 Conference on "Prudential Judgment, Public Policy, and the Catholic
Social Tradition," and as part of a lecture series on "Faithful Citizenship" sponsored by Fordham
Law School's Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer's Work. Thanks to Bruce Green, Russ Pearce,
Lisa Schiltz, Peggy Steinfels, and Amy Uelmen for helpful comments.
L DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE: VIRTUE AND NATURAL LAW IN
THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN ETHICS 84 (1992) (quoting AUGUSTINE,
DE MORIBUS ECCLESIAE CATHOLICAE [OF THE MORALS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH] ch. IS),
2. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
1567, 1614 (1985) (arguing that "[p]hilosophy is a discipline that seeks first principles, clear and
distinct truths, and any theory, like prudentialism, which celebrates qualities of mind and character
that not only resist principled analysis but actually reflect a skeptical mistrust of philosophical
argument, cannot itself be a philosophy").
46
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Consider the ubiquitous invocations of individual conscience-long
considered a sacred fixture of the American ideologicallandscape3 -as a
trump card to be played against whatever institution happens to stand between the individual and her core moral convictions. Our public discourse
long ago moved beyond any suggestion that an individual's conscience is
the proper object of government regulation. The debate has been conclusively settled, in effect granting a trump to the dictates of conscience. The
problem is that our collective certainty in the sanctity of individual conscience sheds very little light on many of the most pressing disputes over
the role of religion in modem society. There is a rapidly expanding and
intensifying conflict centering on the role that religious faith should play in
the provision of the goods deemed foundational in our society, goods such
as health care, education, charitable services, and law. These disputes do
not pit the monolithic state against the noble individual. Rather, the battle
lines are forming between consumer and provider, with both acting according to the dictates of conscience. Conscience drives a single mother to conclude that the morning-after pill is her best option to prevent an unplanned
pregnancy, but also drives a pharmacist to decline to fill her prescription.
Conscience drives a public school teacher to talk about the Christian heritage of our country during class, but also drives the parents of his students
to insist that he be prohibited from doing so. Conscience drives a minor to
seek an abortion, but also drives a Catholic lawyer to refuse to help her
obtain judicial permission for that abortion. In these and other scenarios, the
mere invocation of conscience's sanctity does not bring resolution. 4
The principle-the liberty of conscience-is beyond question, but it
cannot be invoked in the abstract, like a blunt hammer, and imposed on
whatever scenario arises. Such tactics may work when state power targets
an individual directly, but the competing claims made in many of our current contests over personal liberty have shifted, and our conversation must
change accordingly. We need to begin to talk about prudence and explore
its potential to serve as an accessible tool by which to resolve the conflicting invocations of fixed principles without sacrificing the power or validity
of the principles themselves.
Prudence requires a consideration of the context in which an actor's
conscience is to be exercised, and in many of our current disputes over
conscience, our understanding of an actor's context will require an under-

3. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST REuGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(June 20, 1785) in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, at 30 (Jake Rakove ed., 1999) (arguing that religious devotion "must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate").
4. See Steven D. Smith, Interrogating Thomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience, I U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 587 (2003) ("It could be that 'conscience' is little more than an honorific
term that we toss about when it suits our rhetorical purposes.").
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standing of an actor's professional role. s This article will endeavor to elucidate the relevance of prudence to professional role by examining why
prudential judgment looks very different in the decision making of a judge
versus that of a lawyer. In this context, at least, the contours of prudential
judgment are informed by market dynamics: lawyers are market actors;
judges are not. The professional's stance toward those whom they serve,
and our evaluation of the way in which they serve, will turn on this
distinction.
II.

THE RELEVANCE OF ROLE

Even in the legal arena, the mere invocation of conscience does not
necessarily establish the legitimacy of the act for which it is invoked. This
can be readily illustrated by our reactions to the following statements:
• Actor 1, in reference to his public disobedience of a law he perceived to be unjust, said, "I have been ordered to do something I
cannot do, and that is, violate my conscience."6
• Actor 2, in defending his own violation of a law, claims it is appropriate to defy a law "conscience tells him is unjust. "7
Should we react differently to these essentially identical invocations of
conscience as justifications for violating the law? Whether or not we
should, we do: Actor 1 is Roy Moore, former Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court, explaining his refusal to obey a federal court order that he
remove the Ten Commandments monument from the courthouse rotunda. 8
Actor 2 is Martin Luther King Jr., writing as he sat in a Birmingham jail,
arrested for marching without a permit. 9
It is safe to say that even among those who believe that the Ten Commandments should not have been banished from the courthouse, Roy
Moore's understanding of conscience is problematic. At the same time,
very few, regardless of political leanings, would condemn Martin Luther
King Jr. for his version of the same claim. One basis for this discrepancy
lies in role. Specifically, we resist the conflation of the role of the judge
5. See Kronman, supra note 2, at 1569 ("A prudent judgment ... is, above all, one that
takes into account the complexity of its human and institutional setting....").
6. Jeffrey Gettleman, Thou Shalt Not, Colleagues Tell Alabama Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2003, at Al (quoting Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court at a rally).
7. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., LETTER FROM BlRMlNGHAM JAn.. 5 (Apr. 16, 1963), available
at http://www.stanford.edulgrouplKinglfrequentdocslbirmingham.pdf.
8. Chief Justice Moore testified that he placed the monument in the Supreme Court rotunda
"to acknowledge God's law and God's sovereignty." Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1287
(11th Cir. 2003). He rejected a request to permit a monument displaying a historically significant
speech in the same space on the grounds that "[tlhe placement of a speech of any man alongside
the revealed law of God would tend in consequence to diminish the very purpose of the Ten
Commandments monument." Id. at 1284.
9. KING, supra note 7.
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with that of the prophet: 10 those who are called to apply the laws of a nation
evenhandedly and uniformly are evaluated on a substantively different
moral scale than those called to critically engage the nation on the content
of those laws.
There is not a universal resistance to that conflation, though. The late
Yale law professor Robert Cover skewered judges during the Vietnam War
for not publicly engaging "in creative judicial obstruction of the war effort."ll Though there is a huge gulf between Roy Moore and Robert Cover
on the political spectrum, they both seem to conceive of the judge's function as calling for the full integration of moral truth with official role.
Justice Scalia's thought runs in the opposite direction, as he has long
railed against what he calls the '~udge moralist."12 In his famous discussions of the death penalty, he argues that if a judge is morally opposed to
the death penalty, his only option is to resign from the bench.13 At least on
this issue,14 he sees no space for judges who hold moral convictions that
diverge from the positive law machinery they are obliged to operate. He
stands with Moore and Cover in recognizing that a judge may not ignore his
conscience, but he sees resignation, not subversion, as the acceptable
outcome.
The positions espoused by Moore, Cover, and Scalia provide examples
of principle unleavened by prudence, particularly in failing to account adequately for professional role. Viewing the judge through the lens of prudence helps explain why a fixation on unitary principles in either
direction-that is, conscience compelling subversion or conscience compelling resignation-misses the broader context. A comparison of judges to
lawyers brings greater clarity, underscoring that prudence must account for
context, and in a modern pluralist democracy, the marketplace is a key dimension of that context. In this regard, the exercise of prudential judgment
is different than the exercise of conscience, especially as the latter is understood in modern American legal parlance as an inward-looking, non-negotiable, personal moral stance. Prudential judgment is role-constrained, shaped
directly by the surroundings.
10. On using the biblical prophet as a model for lawyers, see generally Thomas L. Shaffer,
The Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 469 (2003).
II. Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD HlLDRETII, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856».
12. The Associated Press, Scalia Critical of What He Calls the 'Judge-Moralist', BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/newsJIocallmassachusetts/artic1es/
2006/03/15/scalia_criticaCof/.
13. "My vote, when joined with at least four others, is, in most cases, the last step that
permits an execution to proceed. I could not take part in that process if I believed what was being
done to be immoral." Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, 17, 17-18 (2002).
14. Cf id. at 18 ("[A] judge, I think, bears no moral gUilt for the laws society has failed to
enact. Thus, my difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one.").
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One key to understanding prudential judgment's implications for any
real-world issue is coming to grips with its nuanced, practical orientation.
Prudence resists categorical answers, but does not ignore absolute truths; it
is not unprincipled, but it does require an appreciation of context. As the
path by which general principles are connected with lived reality, prudence
turns on particular circumstances,15 seeking "to discern what is to be done
now or in the future on the basis of knowledge of the present situation and
past experience."16 Cultivating prudence as a virtue, operating in combination with other virtues,17 is necessary "precisely because our powers of will
and intellect are not determined to specific ends."IS Prudence thus cannot
be acquired as a theoretical matter via cognitive grasp or as a one-time
devotion of the will; on the contrary, it must be "obtained and perfected
through practice in deliberation and action, just as the virtue of temperance,
for example, is cultivated through acting temperately."19 Put simply, prudence allows us "to act in the right way, for the right reasons, and at the
right time."20
Recognizing the contextual nature of prudential judgment is not meant
to suggest that prudence can be understood fully in narrow slices of human
existence. Aquinas cautioned against equating prudence with a particular
role:
There are seeming prudences which contrive means for bad ends,
like the prudence of the thief planning to thieve well. There are
genuine but partial prudences: particular and not general like prudence in trade, or general but incomplete like that of men who
investigate and decide well but don't implement their decisions.
Prudence that is genuine, general and complete is the virtue of
prudence ... ,21
Nelson explains that, "[tlo say that someone is prudent in an unqualified
way is to say that he or she is prudent about life in general."22
Certainly an individual who practices prudential judgment only in her
professional role should not be mistaken for a person of prudence. By the
15. R.J. Araujo, S.J., Thomas Aquinas: Prudence, Justice. and the Law, 40 Loy. L. REv. 897,
908 (1995) ("[P]rudence directs us to specify that action which we must take in particular circumstances to do that which is good and avoid that which is evil in every day life.").
16. NELSON, supra note I, at 81.
17. "[P]rudence needs the inclinations of justice, temperance, and fortitude as given matter
already existing within the person." JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS IN
THOMAS AQUINAS'S SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 103 (1992); see also NELSON, supra note I, at 48 ("The
virtues do not operate autonomously but are coordinated and directed by reason through the virtue
of prudence.").
18. NELSON, supra note 1, at 69.
19. [d. at 79.
20. [d. at 81.
21. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGlAE, Part [[ o/the Second Part q. 47 a. 13 (Timothy
McDermott trans., 1989).
22. NELSON, supra note I, at 79.
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same token, an individual who is prudent only in her personal life lacks a
vital dimension of prudence's import. The notion that universal principles
emanating from the revealed order can or should be disconnected from
one's professional life defies the unity of the human person and the allencompassing validity of those principles. What is significant for our purpose is to note that the exercise of prudence in an individual's professional
decision making may not resemble the exercise of prudence in her personal
life. The lessons imparted by those universal principles may depend on the
interests to be served by the specific role at issue. After all, principles need
not be uniformly applied to be universally valid.
Especially in a publicly oriented vocation like the law,23 the contextspecific inquiry demanded by prudential judgment does not make our conception of prudence unduly narrow; rather, it acknowledges the power of
prudence to bring general principles to bear on every aspect of an individual's life. Engaging the professional side of the inquiry should be seen as
expanding prudence's reach, not narrowing its claim.
Seen in this light, lawyers and judges can recognize and articulate the
ends of prudential judgment only by recognizing and articulating the ends
of their specific roles. Jean Porter explains that "when Aquinas says that
prudence determines the things that are directed toward the ends of the
moral virtues, what he is saying is that prudence determines which courses
of activity and specific actions would instantiate the virtues in the specific
situations that make up our lives."24 Prudence, in other words, will help us
determine what specific action "is required in a particular situation in order
to meet the demands of the relevant virtue."25 Porter uses the example of
eating a brownie. If we conclude that the demands of temperance require us
to refuse a third brownie, no meaningful analysis of means or ends is necessary beyond recognizing the demand. All we need to do is decline the
brownie. 26 The practice of prudence as a virtue enables the realization of
other virtues, and the identity of those virtues arises from the facts at hand.
III.

LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND THE MARKET

Given the nature of prudence, it may be more instructive to begin with
my conclusion then trace the path by which prudence led to that conclusion.
Accordingly, the exercise of prudential judgment results in a judge having
less room to integrate her rightly-formed conscience into her professional
role than a lawyer will have. The judge's exercise of prudence will justify
her facilitation of means or ends that may create tension with an authentic
23. Interestingly, Aquinas spoke of a "true fonn of prudence that is oriented to public rather
than private life." Id. at 83.
24.

JEAN PORTER, THE REcOVERY OF VIRTUE: THE RELEVANCE OF AQUINAS FOR CHRISTIAN

159 (1990).
25. Id.
26. [d.

ETIlICS
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vision of the human person, as her professional role gives her less room for
discretionary moral judgment. The lawyer has greater room for moral discretion in her exercise of professional judgment, which means that her exercise of prudence will more rarely justify her facilitation of means or ends
that conflict with the moral anthropology. This may help explain Pope John
Paul II's statement contrasting judges with lawyers on the matter of divorce, in which he asserted that "[l]awyers, as independent professionals,
should always decline the use of their profession for an end that is contrary
to justice, as is divorce," while acknowledging that, "[f]or judges this may
prove difficult, since the legal order does not recognize a conscientious objection to exempt them from giving sentence.'>27
One way to view this distinction is that prudence warrants less deference by lawyers to prospective clients than is owed by judges to litigants,
and this disparity in deference is a function, in significant part, of a marketplace dynamic. Judges should be discouraged from bringing in extralegal
norms to their work, and lawyers may be encouraged to bring in extralegal
norms to their work, because lawyers are market actors and judges are not.
If a lawyer decides to integrate Christian principles into her legal practice, and her integration leads her to tell the client, for example, that the
lawyer will not attempt to impeach a witness if she believes that the witness
is telling the truth, the client's moral agency has not been denied. The client
can embrace that approach or decline to proceed with the representation and
choose another lawyer. The American Bar Association's Model Rules are
clear that "[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or
without cause."28
The theoretical ability to choose another lawyer may not always mean
much in practice, of course. If a litigant can reject her court-appointed lawyer only by paying for one herself, market dynamics are illusory. And even
in the corporate sphere, the market had less vitality in earlier times given
the tendency of large companies to attach themselves to a single law firm
for decades, and to give all their legal business to that firm, ensuring that
switching representation would incur a huge cost in terms of the firm's
accumulated knowledge of, and familiarity with, the client.
27. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Prelate Auditors, Officials and Advocates of the Tribunal of the Roman Rota (Jan. 28, 2(02), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy3ather/john_pauI_
iilspeeches/2002/january/documentslbfjp-ii_spe_20020128Joman-rota_en.htrnl (emphasis in
original); see also David O'Reilly, Pope's Words Unsettle Catholic Lawyers, PHIL. INQUIRER,
Feb. 3,2002, at B05 (reporting on the pope's statement to the Roman Rota); Cindy Wockner &
Amelia Kerr, Pope Acts to Stem 'Plague'-Catholic Lawyers Asked to Stop Handling Divorce
Cases, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 30, 2002, at 9 ("Pope John Paul II has created a storm of
controversy around the world after calling on Catholic lawyers and judicial officers to avoid working on divorce cases."); Melinda Henneberger, John Paul Says Catholic Bar Must Refuse Divorce
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A4 (reporting that the pope instructed that "civil lawyers who
are Roman Catholic must refuse to take divorce cases").
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.16 cmt. 4 (2003).
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Things have changed now, though. Ronald Gilson identifies the rise of
the in-house legal counsel as having largely eliminated "the information
asymmetry between client and lawyer, so that no relationship-specific assets are created and no lock-in effect results."29 The consequence is "a dramatic reduction in the switching costs facing clients and an elimination of
lawyers' market power."30 Companies shop around among a variety of
firms for each significant matter, staging beauty contests where firms
parade through a conference room and do their best to sell themselves to the
client. Much of the decision-making power now resides with in-house legal
departments. But it is clear that, at least for corporate clients who are able to
pay, they have a variety of options when it comes to their legal
representation.
Anyone who doubts the power of market forces in the legal profession
need look no further than the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s. One of
the central figures, Charles Keating, expected his lawyers to push the envelope further than they were comfortable doing, and they resisted. His response was to fire the firm, and hire Kaye Scholer. The rest is well
documented in any legal ethics casebook, as Kaye Scholer ended up paying
$41 million to the government stemming from the firm's various ethical
transgressions committed in deference to the market forces that kept its relationship with Keating so precarious. 31 A similar dynamic is evidenced in
the Enron debacle.32 As David Wilkins observes, "[i]n a competitive market
filled with sophisticated repeat players, outside firms have little incentive to
fail to seek their client's objectives,"33 even as those objectives push the
bounds of the law. 34
29. Ronald Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
MD. L. REv. 869, 902-03 (1990).
30. Id.
31. William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998).
32. Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 Goo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225,
240 (2006) ("Every colorable explanation [of Enron's collapse] implicates Enron's lawyers as
having failed to provide a needed check on the self-aggrandizing transgressions of Enron's management."); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REv.
1167 (2005); David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 Goo. L.J. 61, 88 (2003) ("Enron was badly advised by its lawyers, primarily
Vinson & Elkins."); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 J.
CORP. L. 427, 428 (2004); Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers PostEnron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017 (2004); Rohert W. Gordon, A New Rolefor Lawyers?: The
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1185 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D.
Paton, Lawyers. Ethics. and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9 (2002).
33. David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessonsfrom
the Diversity Wars, 11 Goo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 884 (1998).
34. See id. at 885 ("ff the Kaye, Scholer case is any indication, the economic incentives
created by the new information order are likely to persuade some significant number of lawyers to
move beyond tacitly refusing to stop their client's wrongdoing and to become active participants
in the corruption of the legal framework.").
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Litigants do not have remotely similar discretion in choosing their
judge as clients have in choosing their lawyers. They may be able to seek
recusal in cases where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,35 but that's a far cry from an ability to deliberately align one's understanding of a proper judicial function with a judge who actually
embodies that understanding. Witness the minor media storm in Chicago
several years ago when two lawyers filed five identical suits within fourteen
minutes on behalf of their client, hoping to land one of them with a preferred judge. 36 The lawyers and their firm were fined, and the state ethics
committee opened an investigation. 37
There is no marketplace of judges. And more than that, there is no
marketplace of judicial authority. Judges are the gatekeepers for the legitimate exercise of the state's coercive power, which it exercises on behalf of
citizens. If individuals have a dispute that they cannot work out through
private ordering, they need the authority that judges provide.
The recognition of market dynamics has significant implications for
the function of prudence in the roles of judge and lawyer. The absence of a
market makes a provider's exercise of conscience-even a rightly formed
conscience-much more problematic. It is not just because we are in a
place, as identified by Tom Shaffer, "where there is no difference between
the Christian believer and those who worship the idols of civil religion."38
And it is not simply a begrudging concession to the rule of law that justifies
a judge's self-restraint of conscience; there is an affirmative case to be
made for why judges should embrace a certain degree of disconnection between their personal convictions and professional decision making. It flows
from a vision of the rule of law as a moral good, a vision that is consistent
with foundational elements of Catholic social teaching. Four elements in
particular make up the content that the concept of role brings to prudential
judgment.
First, subsidiarity holds that the lowest body that can address a problem effectively should be empowered to do so. In the words of Pope Pius
XI, a free society should embody the "most weighty principle" of
subsidiarity:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and
higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can
do. For every social activity oUght of its very nature to furnish
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
36. See Randall Sambom, Chicago Judge Sanctions Firm, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A4.

37. See id.
38. Thomas L. Shaffer, Nuclear Weapons. Lethal Injection, and American Catholics: Faith
Confronting American Civil Religion, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 7, 19 (2000).
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help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and
absorb them.39
This fundamental ordering "must be respected" because "needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as
neighbours to those in need," a perception that derives, in tum, from the
fact that "certain kinds of demands often call for a response which is not
simply material but which is capable of perceiving the deeper human
need."40
In keeping with subsidiarity, individual judges cannot be tasked with
settling legal disputes by invoking their own consciences, as such an individualized approach effectively disempowers citizens by negating the lawmaking efficacy of their democratic participation. Citizens do not enjoy full
access to the law, but an access limited by the substance of the judge's
convictions. If, for example, a judge were to ignore the settled principles of
contract law in order to preclude enforcement of an agreement that facilitated a company's production of pornography, the company and its members no longer have the space to order their affairs that is contemplated by
law, but simply the space contemplated by the judge's own moral convictions. The good of reducing pornography may be furthered, but by a path
that precludes a meaningful role for citizens in the resolution of the issue.
This problem is most pronounced in cases that tum on statutory law; for
common law cases, the cost is felt in the loss of the law's predictability and
stability, necessary ingredients for localized empowerment. The judge's
conscience-driven embrace of extralegal norms hampers the ability of associations and individuals to pursue and protect their own interests via unfettered access to the law.
By contrast, when a lawyer stakes out a position based on an extralegal
norm with which the client disagrees, the client has an exit option, assuming that the norms are brought to the surface and made known to the client. 41 If lawyers introduce their own extralegal moral norms into the
representation without the client's knowledge, they are functioning more
like judges, narrowing a client's access without allowing the client to seek
other avenues. 42 A lawyer who advises her client that a contract is unen39. POPE PIus Xl, QUADRAGESIMO ANNo 'l! 79 (May 15, 1931), available at http://benedictumxvi. va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyc1icalsldocumentslhCpxCenc_19310515 _quadragesimo-anno
_en.html.
40. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS 'l! 48 (May 1, 1991), available at http://www.
vatican. va/holy _father/john_paul_iilencyclicals/documents/hfjpii_enc_O I 0519913entesimus-annus_en.html.
41. See, e.g.• Robert K. Vischer. Heretics in the Temple of Law; The Promise and Peril of the
Religious Lawyering Movement. 19 J.L. & REUGION 427, 475 (2004) ("[AJ lawyer is obligated to
keep the client apprised to the extent that the lawyer recognizes the bearing her own religious
convictions and inclinations will have on the decisions presented by the matter.").
42. See, e.g., Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Tum in
Professional Ethics. 150 U. PA. L. REv. 661. 678 (2001) (worrying that, if a faith-informed conciliation approach is followed by all lawyers. there would be "so trnncated a range of lawyering
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forceable without revealing that the conclusion is grounded in her opposition to pornography, rather than the settled law, becomes a moral arbiter,
rather than a partner in moral discourse. 43 But where a client has adequate
information and viable market options, a lawyer is hard-pressed to justify
the facilitation of immoral ends by invoking subsidiarity's impetus of localized empowerment.
Second, solidarity commands that we identify with the good of others,
binding us "to make ourselves the neighbor of every person without exception, and of actively helping him when he comes across our path."44 Solidarity envisions "the other" not only as "a human being with his or her own
rights and a fundamental equality with everyone else, but [as] the living
image of God the Father, redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ and placed
under the permanent action of the Holy Spirit."45 As a result, every person
must "be loved, even if an enemy, with the same love with which the Lord
loves him or her; and for that person's sake one must be ready for sacrifice,
even the ultimate one: to lay down one's life for the brethren."46 Our commitment to others must not be instrumentalist,47 nor can it be a question of
individual duty, for solidarity "is an imperative which obliges each and
every man and woman, as well as societies and nations."48 At its core, then,
solidarity "is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress" at
others' misfortunes, but rather "a firm and persevering determination to
commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of
each individual, because we are all really responsible for all."49 What is
needed is "a commitment to the good of one's neighbor with the readiness,
in the gospel sense, to 'lose oneself for the sake of the other instead of
exploiting him, and to 'serve him' instead of oppressing him for one's own
advantage. "50
For judges, this means that the disposition of the neighbor's claim requires doing so in a way that, even if not agreeable to the neighbor, is
styles for a client who seeks to vindicate a right, not reconcile with an opponent, or whose sense
of violation would be compounded, not assisted, by efforts to seek reconciliation," and about "the
lawyer who is so intent on conciliation that he or she does not explore with the client all the
litigation options").
43. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
231,244 (1979) (recognizing that the "[l]awyer and client depend on one another and influence
one another," and that this "moral interdependence is the basis of [their] conversation").
44. POPE PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ET SPES '][ 27 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vatican.
vaiarchivelhisccouncils/ii_vatican_councilldocumentslvatii_cons_19651207-8audium-et-spes_
en.html.
45. POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS ,][40 (Dec. 30, 1987). available at http://
www.vatican.valholy_father/john_pauUilencyclicals/documents/hfjpii_enc_30121987 _sollicitudo-rei-sociaHs_en.html.

46. ld.
47. ld. '][ 39.
48. ld. '][32.
49. ld. 'I 38.

50. ld.
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accessible to the neighbor. 51 Conscience is not accessible in the way that
collectively decided legal nonns are. 52 It would be highly problematic, for
example, for a family court judge to award custody of a child to a parent on
the sole ground that the parent intended to raise the child as a Christian, and
the other parent intended to raise the child in another faith tradition. Putting
aside the obvious Establishment Clause concerns, the ruling stands in tension with solidarity because the ruling's basis makes sense only from a
premise that accepts the validity of Christianity's claims of divinely revealed truth. The importance of ensuring the appearance of accessibility and
evenhandedness also explains the requirement that judges forego the partisan political activity in which other citizens are entitled to participate. 53
Besides the problem of inaccessible outcomes, there is the related
problem of unpredictable outcomes. A judge's elevation of conscience over
positive law fails to respect the moral agency of individuals because the
content or implications of conscience are not knowable beforehand. One
virtue of the rule of law is that individuals can structure their actions with
the law's content in view; such is not possible when the law's content resides in the heart of whichever judge they happen to draw. Conscience
tends not to be accessible, nor predictable54-two traits that are obstacles to
a legal order reflective of solidarity. But again, as long as clients operate
with adequate infonnation and viable alternatives, the inaccessibility and
unpredictability of the implications that a lawyer's conscience might have
for the representation are not similarly problematic.
Third, the principle of reciprocity reminds us that natural rights "are
inextricably bound up with as many duties, all applying to one and the same
person," and that these "rights and duties derive their origin, their sustenance, and their indestructibility from the natural law, which in conferring
the one imposes the other."55 This understanding of reciprocity springs not
51. Teresa Collett, "The King's Good Servant, But God's First:" The Role of Religion in
Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1277. 1299 (2000) (HIn deference to the free will of
the individual. and the good of communal self-governance. deep respect for the positive law
should govern the vast majority of a judge's decisions.").
52. Kent Greenawalt, Natural LAw and Public Reasons. 47 Vru.. L. REv. 531. 549 (2002)
("Within the law. judges are supposed to rely on reasons that have force for other judges. and the
reasons need to be accessible, both in the sense of being comprehensible and in the sense of being
capable of being grasped on the basis of rational thought, not faith or intuition.").
53. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 7 (2000) ("A judge should
not ... make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or
purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions.").
54. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1946) ("Stripped of all its technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its
coercive powers in given circumstances ....").
55. POPE JOliN xxm, PACEM IN TERRIS 'J[ 28 (William J. Gibbons, SJ. ed.) (Apr. 11, 1963),
available at http://www.vatican.valholy_father/john_xxiiilencyclicalsJdocumentslhCixxiii_enc_
11041963_pacem_en.html.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

58

[Vol. 4:1

from some hypothetical social contract, but from our very nature, which
draws us into relationships. 56
The contours of an individual's professional role cannot be defined
without reference to the relationships in which it is embedded. When judges
put their own conscience-driven claims to the side in order to adjudicate
cases based on the settled law they are serving "the other." This service is
not a one-way act of charity, but a recognition of the mutual self-giving 57
between citizens on which the rule of law is founded. 58 As John Finnis puts
it, "the good that is common between friends is not simply the good of
successful collaboration or coordination, nor is it simply the good of two
successfully achieved coinciding projects or objectives; it is the common
good of mutual self-constitution, self-fulftllment, self-realization."59 Judges
as private citizens enjoy the liberty of action made possible by the rule of
law, a rule for which a degree of self-restraint by all citizens is necessary.60
With lawyers, their integration of extralegal norms with their practice, if
done openly, does not threaten a prospective client's liberty of action. The
self-restraint needed by lawyers is simply to resist the temptation to subvert
the client's autonomy through the covert introduction of extralegal norms.
Fourth, the common good, which is the "sole reason for the existence
of civil authorities,"61 requires a "healthy social pluralism."62 In this way,
"[t]he different components of society are called to build a unified and harmonious whole, within which it is possible for each element to preserve and
develop its own characteristics and autonomy."63 Aquinas acknowledged
the place of pluralism when he recognized that prudence entails different
actions depending on the community in which the actor is located; subjects
of a monarchy act prudently in a different way than citizens of a democ56. Kenneth R. Himes, Rights of Entitlement: A Roman Catholic Perspective, II NOTRE
J.L. E1HICS & PuB. POL'y 507. 516 ("Society is established neither because of sin nor the
formation of a social contract but is due to the very nature of persons .... If life is to flourish. it is
necessary for human beings to give and receive in relationships.").
57. POPE PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 44,'24 (explaining that man cannot "fully
find himself except through a sincere gift of himself').
58. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Catholic Neo-Scholastic Contribution to Human Rights: The
Natural Law Foundation. I AVE MARIA L. REv. 159, 162 (2003) ("Aquinas further refined the
notion of justice as being the mutuality or reciprocity shared among the members of society and
essential to the dignity of each person when he argued that 'the virtue of the good citizen is
general justice. whereby each person is directed to the common good.''').
59. JOHN F1NNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 286-87 (1980).
60. Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First Amendment, 34 CONN. L.
REv. 405, 405 (2002) (referring to reciprocity as "the disposition of citizens to engage in cooperative behavior with each other for mutual benefit"),
61. POPE JOHN
PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 55, , 54.
62. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHURCH <J[ 151 at 66 (2004), available at http://www.vatican.valroman_curialpontifical_
councilsljustpeaceldocuments/rc_pc,justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
DAME

xxm.

63. Id.
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racy.64 But every form of prudence will direct the individual "to the common good on which her individual good depends."65
It is important to remember that the common good cannot be confused
with the collective good, on one hand, or the individual good, on the
other-it encompasses both by transcending both. As Jacques Maritain explains, "[t]he common good is common because it is received in persons,
each one of whom is a mirror of the whole."66 In Maritain's work, as elucidated by Patrick Brennan, "the common good is not the collection or a
summation of private goods; neither is it the good of a whole such that the
goods of the components are sacrificed to the good of the whole."67 Rather,
it is "the shared life of a political community of free persons living oriented
toward justice, friendship, and the transcendent."68
The individual has a stake in the common good,69 even though she
remains "inferior and subordinated to the whole and must, as an organ of
the whole, serve the common work."70 But she is not simply incorporated
into the whole; she stands apart, and her flourishing cannot be equated with
the interests of the collective, though they are inescapably related. On this
point, Maritain warrants quoting at length:
For in the person there are some things-and they are the most
important and sacred ones-which transcend political society and
draw man in his entirety above political society-the very same
whole man who, by reason of another category of things, is a part
of political society. By reason of certain relations to the common
life which concern our whole being, we are a part of the state; but
by reason of other relations (likewise of interest to our whole being) to things more important than the common life, there are
goods and values in us which are neither by nor for the state,
which are outside of the state.71
As a trigger for the invocation of the state's coercive force, the judicial
voice must speak with deference toward the dimension of the common good
64. PORTER, supra note 24, at 164-65.
65. ld. at 165.
66. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GooD 49 (1966).
67. Patrick Brennan, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRIS.
TIANITY ON LAW, POLmcs AND HUMAN NATURE 75, 94 (John Witte & Frank S. Alexander eds.,
2006).
68. ld. at 95.
69. See MARrrAIN, supra note 66, at 51 ("[T]he common good of the city implies an intrinsic
ordination to something which transcends it, it is because it requires, by its very essence and
within its proper sphere, communication or redistribution to the persons who constitute society.").
70. 1d. at 70; see also Vincent D. Rougeau, A Crisis of Caring: A Catholic Critique of American Welfare Refonn, 27 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 101, 117-18 (2003) ("The sense ofresponsibility and reciprocity that solidarity require does not grow out of vague emotion or by intellectual
engagement, but through a lived experience of community.").
71. MARITAIN, supra note 66, at 73.
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that is not defined by the collective will.72 This is why it is so important that
judges recognize and invoke the rights needed to protect the human person
from overbearing state incursions on individual and associational autonomy?3 By the same token, the judge must not close down the space needed
for individual self-direction by substituting her own extralegal norms for
the collective will. Judicial self-restraint helps ensure that the common good
is not defined and imposed from above as either a uniform, fixed norm or as
an idiosyncratic product of the judge's own conscience, but is instead realized from the bottom up, constituted by the decisions and day-to-day actions of individuals and the communities to which they belong.
When lawyers within a functioning marketplace introduce extralegal
norms into the advice they give clients or as the basis for declining a representation, they do not close down the divergent paths by which the common
good is realized. In fact, lawyers who bring conscience to bear on their
professional identities can help expand and enrich the common good by
challenging the presumptions of the governing legal paradigm, whether by
critically engaging the substance of the positive law or the objectives that
the client wishes to pursue through the positive law. In keeping with the
common good, the judge must facilitate the exercise of autonomy by nonstate actors; the lawyer, by contrast, can and should help shape the exercise
of autonomy itself.
The principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, reciprocity, and the common
good are not empty vessels to be filled with the actor's preconceived priorities. They are comprised of substantive ideals emanating from a distinctive
worldview. In this regard, they serve to demarcate the path of prudential
judgment in meaningful ways. And yet even within these boundaries, the
path of prudential judgment will take sharply different turns based on the
nature of the traveler's professional role.

IV.

THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDGING

So what does all of this mean in today's culture war terms? To begin
with, it means that a pro-life federal district court judge faced with a constitutional challenge to South Dakota's recently enacted statute banning all
types of abortion will, acting prudently, overturn the law based on the bind72. [d. at 82 ("[T]he good of the community (the authentic and true common good) is superior to the good of the individual person in the order of terrestrial valUi!s according to which the
person is a part of the community. But these values are not equal to the dignity and destiny of the
person.").
73. H[U]ntil men and women learn to live according to love, law is necessary to human
living." Brennan, supra note 67, at 99 (quoting Maritain's statement that "If the person has the
opportunity of being treated as a person in social life ... it is fIrst of all due to the development of
law and to institutions of law." Jacques Maritain, The Conquest of Freedom, in THE EDUCATION
OF MAN: THE EDUCATIONA!. PHn:..OSOPHY OF JACQUES MARrrAIN 172-73 (Donald A. Gallagher &
Idella J. Gallagher eds .• 1962».
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ing precedent of Roe v. Wade. 74 However, a pro-life lawyer asked by
Planned Parenthood to bring the suit challenging the law would not be acting prudently in accepting the representation?5
Another illustrative example occurred in Boston, where the law firm
Ropes & Gray represented Catholic Charities as the latter searched for a
way around a new state requirement that adoption agencies not discriminate
against same-sex couples in placing children. 76 The Harvard Law School's
student chapter of Lambda protested the firm's decision to work on that
case, threatening to picket future on-campus interviewing by the firm, and
the threats appear to have had their desired effect. 77 Regardless of one's
view of the moral claims raised in Lambda's protest, the students' recognition of the moral dimension of a firm's decision to represent a given client
or cause is commendable. For our purposes, it is essential to recognize that
the moral dimension of lawyering amounts to more than the uncritical provision of access to the law: the conduct of the representation, and the acceptance of the representation itself, must be included in the moral
evaluation of the lawyer's role, and the lawyer's extralegal moral norms are
not irrelevant to any such evaluation.
But for a judge, extralegal moral norms should be kept at the margins
when evaluating the performance of her professional role. This is not to
pretend that a judge can function as an amoral robot, stepping out of her
own morally laden identity whenever she picks up the gavel. But by looking
beyond her own moral convictions (which is a starkly different proposition
than pretending her moral convictions do not exist), she can acknowledge
the moral significance of judging without subverting the rule of law. Often
the judge's moral convictions will spark no tension with the legal framework, either because of substantive consistency between the two or because
the law defers to-indeed, welcomes-the judge's exercise of discretion.
But when the judge's convictions encounter resistance from the law, the
value of the restrained judicial conscience comes into relief. Three essential
functions stand out in this regard:
74. But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of
Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & REuG. 33, 37 (1989) ("Where it is not possible for
the judge honestly to avoid the rule of Roe, the judge should refuse to enforce Roe in any event,
not through the subversion of the rule of law, but by challenging the Supreme Court's clearly
erroneous holding, by recusing himself in the particular case, or, if push comes to shove, by
resigning.").
75. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection
and Cooperation with Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1998) ("No religious believer
should accept cases requiring the lawyer to advocate evil acts, or the total disregard of religious
obligations, or the irrelevance of religious beliefs.").
76. See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
11, 2006, at AI.
77. See Sacha Pfeiffer, Harvard Law Group Hits Ropes & Gray, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15,
2006, at EI.
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First, judicial decision making can have a meaningful pedagogical impact, especially when the judge who upholds a settled rule of law nevertheless dissents from the moral implications of the rule. In other words, what
does the judge say in her opinion about the legal rule she upholds? This
dynamic can be seen in federal district court judge Richard Casey's ruling
in which he struck down a partial-birth abortion ban in light of binding
Supreme Court precedent,78 but nevertheless stated in the opinion that the
practice is "gruesome, brutal, barbaric and uncivilized."79 While judges
should not utilize their public pedestals in a way that inspires disrespect for
the law, there is nothing inherent in their professional role that disqualifies
them from drawing the public's attention to the law's moral dimension. 80
Second, judges serve the structural good of maintaining access to the
law even when they facilitate particular problematic ends in a particular
case. 81 A judge's moral qualms about a particular provision of law may
actually deepen and enrich the quality of justice afforded under that provision. 82 Of course, participating in the enforcement of morally objectionable
laws is not without cost, particularly in terms of the legitimacy lent by the
participation, which must be considered in the calculus. 83 But the calculus
cannot simply consist of whatever moral weight is given to the specific
problematic law to be enforced; there is a broader, systemic value to the
morally dissenting judge's continued presence that must be factored into the
equation.
78. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
79. Nan Abortion Fed'n. v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (2004).
80. Cf Scott Idleman, The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 91
VA. L. REv. 515, 533 (2005) ("The inquiry ... cannot simply be why a judge has employed
religion in her reasoning, as if it were an extraordinary or bizarre aberration, but instead whether
her particular use of religion is reasonable or permissible under the circumstances."); Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Susan Craighead & Daniel N. Abrahamson, Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 515, 541-42 (1994) ("Whether
they serve to exalt or challenge the law, words and sentences from the judge's heart most assuredly serve justice.").
81. This is limited by the prohibition against formal cooperation. See, e.g., Pope John Paul
II's reminder that "it is never licit to cooperate formally in evil," which occurs "when an action,
either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct
participation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral intention of the
person committing it." POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELruM VITAE '174 (Mar. 25, 1995), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy3ather/john_pauUilencyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii_enc_25031995_
evangeJium- vitae3n.html.
82. See Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 305, 318
(2004) ("A Catholic judge is entitled to bring that paramount respect for the value of life from his
or her Catholic tradition to capital cases, to insist mat they be handled wim the utmost seriousness
and care and with me fullest measure of procedural due process, even when innocence is not in
doubt.").
83. Stephen Ellman, To Resign or Not to Resign, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1047, 1057 (1997)
(noting mat me presence of morally objecting judges "on me bench might encourage victims of
injustice to seek judicial solutions rather man political mobilization ... [and] might actually
undercut opposition to injustice by lending a veneer of legitimacy to a fundamentally unjust
enterprise.").
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Third, in cases where the exercise of prudence suggests that the structural good is outweighed by the particular harm to be facilitated by a law's
enforcement,84 the judge's ability to recuse herself preserves the good she
does in other cases where the law's indeterminacy may allow a judge's
rightly-formed conception of justice to have a positive impact on the law's
development. 85 "The judge's sense of right and wrong," after all, "shapes,
to some extent, the direction in which the law evolves,"86 and "resignation
deprives the bench of some of those who may be most inclined to try to
encourage positive changes in controlling law."87
These three functions will resolve many questions over a judge's culpability in the enforcement of immoral laws, but they will not resolve all of
them. One thorny question that arises in light of the above analysis concerns
the moral responsibility and professional obligations of the judge in Nazi
Germany. David Luban captures the "central jurisprudential question" of
the Nazi judge as being, "In what way, and to what extent, does the rule of
law ... immunize jurists from the still small voice of conscience?,,88 And
German historian Ingo Muller notes that, thanks to legal positivism, "no
professional group emerged from the Nazi era with so good a conscience as
that of the jurists."89 Given my insistence that a judge should facilitate mor84. Perhaps a trial court judge asked to sentence a death-penalty-eligible defendant would
qualify in this category.
85. Of course, the law's indetenninacy presents a question that also may need to be answered
with reference to the judge's particular role. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Venneule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 889 (2003) ("[E]ven if courts should
follow the ordinary meaning of text, it is reasonable to suggest that administrative agencies need
not, in part because agencies are specialists rather than generalists. Compared to courts, agencies
are likely to have a good sense of whether a departure from formalism will seriously danIage a
regulatory scheme; hence it is appropriate to allow agencies a higher degree of interpretive
flexibility.").
86. Avery Cardinal Dulles, Catholic Social Teaching and American Legal Practice, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 288 (2002); see also Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose
Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice Scalia, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 317, 318 (2003)
("[I]t is neither possible nor desirable for the judiciary to be populated with judges who lack
strong moral convictions."); Paulsen, supra note 74, at 36 ("[W]hile natural law can provide a set
of presumptions for interpreting positive law and serve as an interstitial source of positive law, it
cannot actually displace clear positive law without also displacing the idea of democratic selfgovernment under a written constitution (a value itself supported by natural law)."); Scott C.
Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 537,550
(1998) ("[FJor a judge, in the process of reaching a decision about human relationships or institutions, to stand in eamest before this wealth of religious insight necessarily impresses upon him the
sophistication of his task, the fallibility of his sense of judgment, and the significance of his
fiduciary obligations.").
87. Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His Professional
Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131, 140 (2004).
88. David Luban, A Report on the Legality of Evil: The Case of the Nazi Judges, 61 BROOK.
L. REv. 1139, 1140 (1995) (symposium panel comments).
89. hmo MOLLER, HITLER' S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 219 (DeboralI Lucan
Schneider trans., Harv. U. Press 1991). Muller establishes, though, that legal positivism had its
limits in the Third Reich: "Placing the judiciary under a strict obligation to follow the letter of the
law would have been an impediment to the 'legal order' of the Nazi regime and would have
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ally problematic ends in a particular case in light of the overarching moral
good occasioned by the continued rule of law, should the Nazi judge have
enforced the legal rules of Hitler's democratically elected regime?
The case of the Nazi judge serves as a tragic reflection of the fact that
the governing legal order is not always coextensive with the rule of law,
especially when entire classes of persons are categorically excluded from
the law's protection. Favoring circumscribed discretion for a judge to bring
her conscience to bear on the law's substance should not be construed as
requiring unquestioned judicial support of the existing legal order. Revolution cannot be excluded as the prudent path of last resort, and the covert
subversion of the legal order by judges could be contemplated within that
revolution. At some point, a society reaches a tipping point where the
judges should aim to avoid or minimize the harm caused by a morally bankrupt legal system, and they can do so most effectively as judges, not simply
in their personal capacities. 90 The precise tipping point may be difficult to
discern-much less define in the abstract-and it will not be enough to
point to isolated injustices as a defense for judges who elevate their own
extralegal moral norms above the settled law. Further, the greater moral
agency enjoyed by lawyers remains instructive: if judges, as judges, are
justified in subverting the legal order, lawyers should have joined the
revolution long before.
V.

CONCLUSION

Principles still matter to the exercise of prudence. One such principle
is the structural good of facilitating the democratic pluralism that creates
space for human freedom. This principle should shape our responses to the
high-profile conscience claims of other market actors, such as pharmacists91
and teachers. 92 For these professionals, one's role in contributing to that
structural good will shape the contours of one's prudential judgment. In a
regime where the structural good is not authentically good, prudence cannot
be invoked to justify the facilitation of immoral ends. But in today's American legal system, justice rightly understood requires prudential lines of delimited its power; for this reason, judges were required to declare their loyalty to the Fuhrer rather
than to the law itself." [d. at 220.
90. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 83, at 1051 ("I do not think we would criticize a judge in
Nazi Germany for having devised a way to render consciously false verdicts that preserved the
lives of persecuted Jews-for example, by finding, untruthfully, that the Jews before him were not
Jews, and therefore were not to be executed."); Weinstein, supra note 87, at 140-41 (UIn Nazi
Germany. mass resignation of judges--especially if they gave their reasons-might have
helped.").
91. See Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding Moral
Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 83 (2006).
92. See Robert K. Vise her • The Sanctity of Conscience in an Age of School Choice: Grounds
for Skepticism, 6 MD. L.J. OF RACE, RELlG., GENDER & CLASS 81 (2006).
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marcation between the moral obligations of lawyers and judges. 93 Prudence
does not provide an abundance of categorical pronouncements to guide the
decision making of lawyers and judges, but it offers reason to caution
against categorical pronouncements, albeit a principled caution shaped by
professional role. And in the din of our culture war posturing, perhaps that
is a good place to start.

93. Justice itself cannot be defined absent the exercise of prudence. See KEENAN, supra note
17, at 104 ("Justice as a natural inclination to observe the due measure among persons cannot
attain the rule of reason except as it is moved and directed by prudence, which provides the mean
and is itself the form, rule, and measure of justice.").

